| 巩永华.低碳经济视角下电信基础设施共享策略分析[J].南京邮电大学学报(社会科学版）,2013,(4):61~66 |
| 低碳经济视角下电信基础设施共享策略分析 |
| Strategy analysis of telecom infrastructrue sharing from the perspective of low carbon economy |
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| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 博弈行为 共享策略 电信基础设施 低碳经济 |
| 英文关键词:game behavior sharing strategy telecom infrastructure low carbon economy |
| 基金项目:江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金“ICT促进行业减排的激励政策研究”(2012SJB630049)；
南京邮电大学引进人才基金“电信基础设施共建共享激励与协调机制研究”（NYS211011） |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 电信基础设施共建共享是建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会的要求，可以避免重复建设，提高电信基础设施利用率，有利于节能减排。从低碳经济的视角，引入节能减排考核指标变量，分析运营商的共享博弈行为机理。研究表明：在博弈双方可共享的基础设施规模对称的情形下，双方的最优策略均为共享；当可共享的基础设施规模不对称时，博弈双方是否共享取决于选择不共享时受到的惩罚与共享带来的收入损失差的比较，惩罚大于共享收入损失差时，选择共享，否则不共享是其最优策略。在重复博弈中，博弈双方对不共享受到的惩罚更敏感，推进运营商转向共享的惩罚阈 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Telecom infrastructure co construction and sharing is necessary for a resource saving and environment friendly society, and it will avoid repeated construction, improve the utilization of the telecom infrastructure, and be conducive to energy saving emission reduction. In this paper, energy saving emission reduction assessment variables was introduced, and the game mechanism of sharing behavior was analyzed from the perspective of low carbon economy. The results show that the optimal strategy for both sides is to share when the scales of the infrastructure available for sharing are symmetrical. Whether the two sides choose to share when the scales are not symmetrical depends on the revenue comparison of the punishment of not sharing and the difference between the income and loss of sharing. The optimal strategy is to share when the punishment is more than the difference, otherwise it is not. In a repeated game, the two sides of the game is more sensitive to the punishment of not sharing, and the penalty value of promoting the operater to turn to sharing is reduced. |
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