| 岳书敬,霍晓.跨区域大气污染联合防治中的地方政府
演化博弈分析[J].南京邮电大学学报(社会科学版）,2017,(01):107~116 |
| 跨区域大气污染联合防治中的地方政府
演化博弈分析 |
| Evolutionary game of local governments in the prevention and control of cross regional air pollution |
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| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 大气污染 联合防治 地方政府 演化博弈 |
| 英文关键词:air pollution cross regional governance local government evolutionary game |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年项目“基于绿色生产函数理论的区域绿色发展评价及政策设计研究”（71303042）；江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目“江苏大气污染的社会经济动因与联防联控研究”（2015ZDIXM004） |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 针对大气污染呈现出的复合型、流动性和跨区域的特点，将地方政府在大气污染联合防治中的相互影响总结为“同向外部效应”和“部分排他效应”，应用演化博弈分析法，剖析地方政府之间大气污染联合防治的演化过程和演化结果。研究结果表明：地方政府治污成本的降低、对不治理污染地方政府惩罚力度的加大、地方政府治理大气污染效果的提高、地方政府不治理大气污染可见性的提升、大气污染治理外部性的减弱等都有助于演化博弈的稳定策略向地方政府跨区域联合防治的方向演进，从而有助于提升大气污染的治理效果，达到改善生态环境的目的。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Air pollution is characterized by being complicated, moving and cross regional. In view of this situation, interaction between local governments in the joint prevention and control of air pollution is summed up as “the mutual external effect” and “partial exclusion effect”. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the evolution process and results of the pollution prevention by local governments. The results show that the reduced cost for local governments, the more severe punishment for those with no action, the improved effect, the more visibility of government’s no action and the reduced externality may foster the evolutionary game towards the cross regional air pollution prevention and control, which will help improve the prevention and control effect and make the ecological environment better in the end. |
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