| 姜丽宁,余维新,刘利平.价格敏感性突变下零售商竞争时供应链的协调应对策略[J].南京邮电大学学报(社会科学版）,2024,(02):93~106 |
| 价格敏感性突变下零售商竞争时供应链的协调应对策略 |
| Coordinated strategies of supply chain with competing retailers under price sensitivity disruption |
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| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 价格敏感性突变 零售商竞争 应急管理 Groves批发价契约 |
| 英文关键词:price sensitivity disruption retailers competition disruption management Groves wholesale price contract |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“数字化转型下制造企业内外创新网络共轭演化与动态能力提升机制研究”（72004101）；江苏现代信息服务业决策咨询研究基地项目“移动互联网信息服务链中应急预案启动时间研究”（NYJD217001）；南京邮电大学校项目“网络强国战略下江苏电信产业垂直整合绩效评价指标体系构建研究”（NYTJ21811） |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 针对含有两个竞争零售商的供应链遭受价格敏感性突变时的应对策略进行研究，基于Stackelberg博弈构建了零售商竞争时的供应链应急模型。研究结果表明，当价格敏感性变化不是很大时，仅通过调整产品的零售价格以及横向调配零售商的供货量，就能实现供应链的最优应对；当价格敏感性变化较大时，则需要同时调整生产计划。同时，设计了Groves批发价契约实现分权供应链的协调应对，数值算例显示应急策略是有效的，而且供应商作为协调者有动力采取该应急策略。此外，当生产成本可变时，产品的替代性是不容忽视的因素，尤其是在价格敏感性降低时，对于扩大市场份额具有重要作用。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| A study was conducted on the response strategies of a supply chain with two competing retailers when experiencing price sensitivity disruptions. Based on Stackelberg game theory， a supply chain disruption model was constructed when retailers competed. The research results indicate that when price sensitivity changes are not significant， the optimal response of the supply chain can be achieved by adjusting the retail price of the product and horizontally adjusting the supply volume of retailers； When there is a significant change in price sensitivity， it is necessary to adjust the production plan simultaneously. At the same time， Groves wholesale price contracts were designed to achieve coordinated response in decentralized supply chains. Numerical examples show that the strategy is effective， and they indicate that the supplier， as the coordinator， has the motivation to adopt this strategy. In addition， when production costs are variable， the substitution of products cannot be ignored， especially when price sensitivity decreases， which is of great significance for expanding market share. |
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